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Introduction. 
 
In La formation de l’esprit scientifique (1938), Gaston Bachelard outlined a ‘psychoanalysis of 
knowledge’, suggesting that there had been an historical progression in modes of scientific 
thinking from ‘prescientific’ and ‘scientific’ states to the ‘new scientific spirit’ which emerged 
in 1905, coinciding with Einsteinian relativity.  He elaborated his view of the new scientific 
spirit in Le rationalisme appliqué (1949).  The legacy of these two texts is ambivalent.  The 
question is open whether the new scientific spirit is founded on an applied logic of scientific 
discovery (to borrow from Popper’s title) or is the product of a developmental social 
psychological history of rationalism.  This ambivalence is at the core of the tensions between the 
positions of Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, as they were concealed in Le métier de 
sociologue (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1968) but subsequently revealed in, 
respectively, Méditations pascaliennes (Bourdieu, 1997) and Le raisonnement sociologique 
(Passeron, 1991).  The issue in the present is whether social scientific epistemology should be 
grounded in logic or ontology. What kind of comparative epistemology of social science might 
be possible depends on the answer to this question, and, a fortiori, whether social science has 
universal validity and applicability or only relates to the socio-cultural conditions which 
generate it.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine comparatively the philosophy of social science in 
England and France at about 1850, exploring, in other words, the rival traditions during 
Bachelard’s ‘scientific state’.  The intention is that this should provide the foundation for future 
consideration of the relations between philosophy, politics, and social science in the two 
countries during the period of the ‘new scientific spirit’ and beyond, to the post-scientific 
present.  My starting point, in other words, is the ambivalence of Le métier de sociologue (1968) 
and its deployment of Bachelard’s ambivalence.  I then use the conceptual apparatus which 
Bourdieu elaborated after the publication of Le métier de sociologue to analyse comparatively 
the work of John Stuart Mill and Auguste Comte.  In doing so, I shall be hoping to use 
Bourdieu’s concepts strategically in such a way that they will clarify the issues at stake in the 
opposition between Mill and Comte and simultaneously locate the orientation which I am 
deploying. 
 
The logic of the social sciences as perceived in the 1960s. 
 
In the same year, 1967, in which Habermas first published his Zur Logik der 
Sozialwissenschaften [On the Logic of the Social Sciences] (Habermas, 1970, 1988), Bourdieu 
and Passeron published (only in English) an article entitled “Sociology and Philosophy in France 
since 1945:  Death and Resurrection of a Philosophy without Subject” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 
1967).  What all three authors had in common was that they had not been trained to be social 
scientists.  Habermas had undertaken doctoral research on the 19th century German idealist 
philosopher Schelling which was reflected in his inaugural professorial lecture, subsequently 
appended to his Knowledge and Human Interests (Habermas, 1971).  Bourdieu had produced a 
diplôme d’études supérieures on Leibniz’s critique of Cartesian philosophy of knowledge under 
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the supervision of Henri Gouhier, for whom the history of philosophy was a form of 
philosophical engagement.  Passeron had gained his diplôme d’études supérieures with a 
philosophical/psychological enquiry on mirror images and identity formation under the 
supervision of Daniel Lagache who had been one of the famous cohort of entrants to the Ecole 
Normale Supérieure in 1924 which also included Aron and Sartre and who had become a 
significant competitor to Lacan in controlling the development of French psychiatry.  Habermas 
had been research assistant to Theodore Adorno and had been appointed to the Chair of Social 
Philosophy at the University of Frankfurt.  Raymond Aron was the mentor of both Bourdieu and 
Passeron.  Aron had written his doctoral theses before the war – seeking to establish a non-
Hegelian philosophy of history – and it was only after his appointment to the Chair in Sociology 
at the Sorbonne in 1955 that Aron began to define himself as a sociologist and to take steps to 
institutionalise sociology as a discipline within the French higher education curriculum. As part 
of this process of institutionalisation, Aron established a research centre in the Ecole des Hautes 
Etudes en Sciences Sociales in 1960, subsequently known as the Centre de Sociologie 
Européenne. He appointed Passeron as his research assistant at the Sorbonne and Bourdieu as 
the secretary of his research centre.  Aron generated American funding for empirical research 
and he needed a new generation of young researchers to undertake work which would 
complement or confirm his philosophical perspective.  He was to find that Bourdieu, in 
particular, exhibited a disconcerting independence such that, after the May events of 1968, 
Bourdieu took control of the research centre while, in 1970, Aron was appointed to a Chair at 
the Collège de France where he was able to devote himself to the study of war and international 
relations and prepare his critical analysis of the work of Clausewitz.  Like Aron, Passeron was 
involved in the institutionalisation of sociology.  In the late 1960s he founded and headed a 
department of sociology at the University of Nantes and was then appointed head of sociology at 
the experimental university of Vincennes (subsequently Paris VIII) when it was founded in 1969 
by governmental decree as an innovative pedagogical response to the student unrest of the 
previous year.  
 
Habermas, Bourdieu and Passeron were not trained to be social scientists but, rather, could be 
said to have been trained philosophically.  However, their training within different philosophical 
traditions meant that they sought to generate very different philosophies of social science.  
Habermas began his On  the Logic of the Social Sciences with a clear articulation of what he 
took to be the contemporary problem: 
 
“The once lively discussion initiated by Neo-Kantianism concerning the methodological 
distinctions between natural-scientific and social-scientific inquiry has been forgotten;  
the problems that gave rise to it no longer seem to be of contemporary relevance.  
Scientistic consciousness obscures fundamental and persistent differences in the 
methodological approaches of the sciences.  The positivistic self-understanding prevalent 
among scientists has adopted the thesis of the unity of the sciences;  from the positivist 
perspective, the dualism of science, which was considered to be grounded in the logic of 
scientific inquiry, shrinks to a distinction between levels of development.  At the same 
time, the strategy based on the program of a unified science has led to indisputable 
successes.  The nomological sciences, whose aim it is to formulate and verify hypotheses 
concerning the laws governing empirical regularities, have extended themselves far 
beyond the sphere of the theoretical natural sciences, into psychology and economics, 
sociology and political science.  On the other hand, the historical-hermeneutic sciences, 
which appropriate and analyze meaningful cultural entities handed down by tradition, 
continue uninterrupted along the paths they have been following since the nineteenth 
century.  There is no serious indication that their methods can be integrated into the 
model of the strict empirical sciences.  Every university catalogue provides evidence of 
this actual division between the sciences;  it is unimportant only in the textbooks of the 
positivists. 
This continuing dualism, which we take for granted in the practice of science, is no 
longer discussed in terms of the logic of science.  Instead of being addressed at the level 
of the philosophy of science, it simply finds expression in the coexistence of two distinct 
frames of reference.” (Habermas, 1988, 1-2). 
 
Bourdieu and Passeron, together, would have agreed with Habermas’s essential representation of 
the problem, but there are elements of Habermas’s opening statement which signal the respects 
in which, together, Bourdieu and Passeron would have differed.  Notably, they would have been 
in agreement with each other in resisting Habermas’s contention that the lack of communication 
between the ‘humanities’ and the ‘sciences’ had to be ‘addressed at the level of the philosophy 
of science’.  In collaboration with Jean-Claude Chamboredon, Bourdieu and Passeron published 
Le métier de sociologue in 1968.  The text was sub-titled ‘préalables épistémologiques’ 
[epistemological preliminaries].  The introduction – ‘Epistemology and methodology’ – had a 
sub-section entitled ‘epistemology of the social sciences and epistemology of the natural 
sciences’ in which the authors reflected on the dualism identified by Habermas.  Bourdieu et al. 
argued that the supposed philosophical dualism amongst social scientific practitioners between 
hermeneutics and positivism was a construct designed by both camps to establish their 
distinction.  At each distinctive extreme there was a lack of awareness ‘of the exact philosophy 
of the exact sciences’ (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1991, 7).  The way to escape the 
situation in which caricatures and counter-caricatures were mutually reinforcing, consolidating 
division, was, consequently, to undertake an analysis of social science in practice rather than a 
detached exploration of its logical status.  As Bourdieu et al. put it: 
 
“The way to move beyond these academic debates, and beyond the academic way of 
moving beyond them, is to subject scientific practice to a reflection which, unlike the 
classical philosophy of knowledge, is applied not to science that has been done – true 
science, for which one has to establish the conditions of possibility and coherence or the 
claims to legitimacy – but to science in progress.” (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 
1991, 8) 
 
To take this step involved moving from what Bachelard had characterised as the ‘scientific state’ 
towards an acceptance of what he called the ‘new scientific spirit’, in that it involved a 
renunciation of science as static cognition and an acceptance, instead, of its dynamic 
instrumentality.  It is not surprising that Bourdieu et al. cite Bachelard in elaborating what is 
required to develop an epistemology of the social sciences which is in accord with the ‘new 
scientific spirit’: 
 
“This specifically epistemological task consists in discovering, within scientific practice 
itself, which is constantly confronted with error, the conditions in which one can extract 
the true from the false, moving from a less true to a more true knowledge, or rather, as 
Bachelard puts it, an ‘approximated, that is to say, rectified knowledge’.  Transposed to 
the social sciences, this philosophy of scientific work as the ‘unceasing polemical action 
of reason’ can yield the principles of a reflection capable of inspiring and controlling the 
concrete acts of a truly scientific practice, by defining the specificity of the principles of 
the ‘regional rationalism’ characteristic of sociological science.” (Bourdieu, 
Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1991, 8). 
 
There is no evidence in Le métier de sociologue to lead us to suppose that Bourdieu et al. were 
aware of Habermas’s work in 1967/8, but their common opposition to the position which he 
represented as advocate of ‘academic’, ‘philosophical’, ‘logical’, ‘detached’, or ‘idealist’ 
philosophy of social science concealed the extent to which Bourdieu and Passeron differed from 
each other.  In 1966, Bourdieu had singly published “champ intellectuel et projet créateur” 
(Bourdieu, 1966) [intellectual field and creative project, Bourdieu, 1971].  Here his argument 
was predicated on a model which was to pervade all of his thinking.  Authors of all kinds, 
whether novelists or scientists, produce work which has its motivating origin in their social 
conditions, shaped by their inherited attitudinal dispositions, but communicate that work within 
‘fields’ which are socially constructed, institutionalised discourses.  The process of production 
or publication is one of struggle whereby the author either seeks to retain the integrity of his 
intention, resisting the anticipated reception of the ‘field’ and therefore risking all recognition, or 
accepts the subordination of his intended meaning to the meaning imputed by the ‘field’, thereby 
securing success and reputation.  Bourdieu argued that all intellectual production is situated on a 
continuum between these extremes, but the important point is that, from an early stage in his 
career, Bourdieu operated with a model which assumed that work is generated as a result of a 
process which operates on two levels:  indigenous experience is expressed in the language of 
objectified fields of discourse. This is not conceived of as a static relationship. There is a 
continuous reciprocity between the two levels and some authors contrive to constitute the fields 
within which they place their works, but the underlying assumption is that activities within the 
intellectual field are driven by primary, experiential orientations.  Intellectual activity is strategic 
in the interest of fulfilling non-intellectual goals.  Intellectual superstructure does not reflect 
socio-economic substructure but they are in constantly changing correlation. 
 
In “Sociology and Philosophy in France since 1945” Bourdieu and Passeron had attempted to 
apply the intellectual field/creative project framework to their own situations.  In recognizing the 
opposition between American neo-positivism and humanistic structuralism they supplied socio-
historical explanations, accepting, for instance, that the humanistic strain in the work of Lévi-
Strauss was a consequence of the influence of existentialism which itself had been the product of 
the experience of resistance and liberation of a generation of French intellectuals.  They knew 
that they were philosophers-turned-sociologists who were seeking, as a consequence, to 
propagate a philosophically sensitive sociology in opposition to ‘professional’ American 
sociologists who claimed that their neo-positivism was a-philosophical.  However, Passeron 
chose, in the end, not to subject intellectual distinctions to socio-historical scrutiny.  He had 
been sceptical of Bourdieu’s attempt to analyse the development of photographic practice by 
reference to the emergence of photographic clubs, preferring, instead, to explore the language 
developed by discreet social groups to articulate their responses to photographic images, in 
comparison with the consecrated aesthetic discourse of art appreciation.  La reproduction 
(Bourdieu & Passeron, 1970) was a text which papered over the cracks between their positions 
as much as had Le métier de sociologue.  Bourdieu’s immediate representation of the message of 
the book in his “Reproduction culturelle et reproduction sociale” (Bourdieu, 1971) was one 
which Passeron did not share in that, again, cultural transmission was ‘reduced’ to a matter of 
social position-taking, deprived of its autonomy.  The same divergence is apparent, certainly 
retrospectively, in Le métier de sociologue.  They both signed up to the notion that Bachelard’s 
‘applied rationalism’ should be the methodological formula for unifying social science within a 
self-criticising and reflexive epistemic community, but Bourdieu was more interested in 
developing the social conditions which would enable such a community to exist whereas 
Passeron became steadily more interested in analysing the concepts deployed in sociological 
discourse.  Perhaps mediated by the influence of Aron, Passeron became more interested in the 
boundaries between plural, applied rationalisms, whilst Bourdieu sought to develop an 
ontologically grounded positivism, more in accord with Bachelard’s psychoanalysis of 
knowledge.  Habermas argued that the contemporary ‘scientistic consciousness’ was intent on 
emphasizing the unity of the sciences and was, in the process, de-differentiating between 
discourses.  In this sense, Le métier de sociologue deployed Bachelard’s formula to unify social 
science and to de-differentiate between disciplines and ideological positions in a way which was 
alien to Passeron’s later attempts to identify the practical logics of history, sociology, 
economics, or anthropology.  It could, therefore, be said that Bourdieu’s dominant input to Le 
métier de sociologue was Durkheimian, in the tradition derived from Comte, whereas Passeron’s 
orientation had an affinity with the non-idealist logic of social scientific explanation introduced 
by John Stuart Mill.  
 
The early 19th century contexts of the production of philosophies of social science. 
 
The philosophical positions which I have attributed to Habermas, Bourdieu and Passeron 
correlate with the the ideologies or presumed social functions of intellectuals and universities as 
they developed in Germany, France and England from the beginning of the 19th Century, and 
these need to be summarised before giving particular attention to the thinking of Comte and 
Mill.  An unavoidable starting-point is in a comparison between the responses to, and effects of, 
Kantian philosophy.  Kant taught throughout the second half of the 18th Century in Königsberg 
within a system in which a new nation state (Prussia) saw the primary purpose of the university 
as being to deliver trained and obedient state functionaries.  He taught in the lower faculty 
which, since medieval origins, was thought to be subservient to the dominant faculties and 
where instruction was thought only to be preparatory to the dogmatic instruction which took 
place in these higher faculties (of Law, Theology, and Medicine).  Within the lower faculty, 
Kant developed a philosophy of knowledge which emphasized the a priori structural 
determinants of all forms of knowledge.  In other words, he developed a position which was not 
just one amongst other possible philosophical positions but one which argued that the essential 
raison d’être of philosophy was to explore the limits of all forms of knowledge and their claims 
to truth.  The importance of The Conflict of the Faculties, one of Kant’s last works (Kant, ed. 
Gregor, 1992), was that, in it, Kant sought to institutionalise the a priorism of his critical 
philosophy.  The philosophy faculty was to embody proactive consideration of the grounds of 
knowledge of everything communicated in the university and, as such, was to challenge the 
authoritarianism of the prescribed curriculum sponsored by the state.  The different reactions to 
the Kantian legacy mainly arise from the distorting effects of Napoleon’s domestic and imperial 
policies.   Within France, there were no universities in the 19th century until 1896.  The 22 
universities which had previously existed before 1789 were abolished by the Revolution.  
Instead, Napoleon instituted specialised écoles to offer professional and technical training and 
the old universities were fragmented into independent faculties.  Professors and teaching staff 
were state appointments and servants of the state.    The 1795 Convention had placed education 
under local control, but, instead, Napoleon established the Imperial University.  By this was 
meant the entire system of administrators and teachers at primary, secondary and tertiary levels, 
all employed and supervised by the state.  The system was run by the Grand Master and the 
Conseil de l’Université, and the country was divided into administrative districts called 
academies headed by rectors, with two inspecteurs d’académie.  Napoleon’s laws were aimed to 
establish a monopoly of education to combat the competition of religious schools for students.  
Teachers not employed by the state were allowed to teach, but confessional schools were 
required to be incorporated into the University and to pay a yearly fee into its treasury.  The 
Imperial monopoly was essentially a mechanism of surveillance whereby the state could keep 
control over the activities of the Church. The idea that universities were institutions dealing with 
the whole of human knowledge was abandoned.  The elements of the former universities were 
fragmented into independent ‘faculties’ which were designed to provide professional training.  
They were closely associated with secondary schools, both by assessing the work of students in 
lycées and by accrediting future school teachers.  In mid-19th century France, 16 towns had 
faculties. All of these towns had, minimally, faculties of sciences and letters (but not necessarily, 
for instance, faculties of medicine or theology). 
 
Napoleon’s military aggression had an unintended opposite effect on the development of 
German universities.  In the settlement of the Treaty of Tilsit of 1807, Prussia lost the territory 
which contained the University of Halle.  Plans were immediately made to establish a new 
university in Berlin and there was sophisticated debate about what should be the nature and 
function of the new institution.  Those most involved in the debate were a younger generation of 
post-Kantian philosophers, notably Schelling, Fichte, Schleiermacher, von Humboldt and Hegel.  
These transformed the Kantian notion of a critical faculty within the university.  The post-
Kantians undermined Kant’s commitment to rationality and emphasized, instead, the primacy of 
identity, either of the self or of the state, discovered through historical and cultural research.  
Their influence contributed to the consolidation of an ideology of a liberal university which, as a 
total institution, performed the critical function for society which Kant had only envisaged for 
philosophy within the institution.  It was this ethos which dominated  throughout the 19th 
Century in Prussia and generated German historical and cultural scholarship. At the end of the 
19th Century,  it generated the alternative, hermeneutic, philosophy of social science which we 
associate with Dilthey, Simmel and Weber. 
 
The effect of the Napoleonic wars on English society was to reassert pre-revolutionary 
privileges.  In introducing his A History of the English People in 1815, Elie Halévy commented 
that in 1748 Montesquieu had praised the English constitution, associated with Whig 
governments, for the way in which it secured the liberty of the subject, but that, in 1815, there 
had been over thirty years of government by the Tories – the ‘supporters of the Royal 
Prerogative’.  For Halévy, this raised a ‘delicate’ problem which was 
 
“… to understand the development by which a theory elaborated to defend a constitution 
regarded by the Whigs as essentially a free constitution served fifty or sixty years later to 
defend a constitution denounced by the Whig Opposition as oppressive and reactionary.”  
(Halévy, 1987, 3) 
By 1850 there were 4 main university institutions in England – Oxford (12th Century); 
Cambridge (13th Century); University College, London (1826) and King’s College, London 
(1829) affiliated with the University of London, chartered in 1836; and Durham (chartered in 
1832), but, in 1815, the two traditional universities remained bastions of social privilege, 
performing functions still essentially subordinate to the Church, offering neither training for 
state functionaries nor generating a critical intellectual elite.   It was only after 1850 that the 
influence of the legacy of 18th century Evangelicalism, combined with the introduction of 
contemporary German philosophy, led to the emergence of a particular philosophical position 
which absorbed and re-legitimated the traditionally exclusive patronage of Oxford education.  
The prime mover was T.H. Green who became a student at Balliol College, Oxford in 1855 at 
the age of 19. Green spent summers in Germany in the early 1860s and gradually developed a 
moral philosophy which entailed an impulse towards benign social philanthropy.  It was a 
philosophy which articulated a non-theological moral imperative for the benevolence which was 
an inherited disposition of evangelicalism.  It was a philosophy which became a substitute for 
the ethos of classical education which had underpinned Oxford’s production of the ruling classes 
of the British empire.  This substitution was achieved by the alliance between the form of 
philosophy teaching advocated by those most responsible for the reform of Oxford education – 
Jowett and Pattison – and the content advanced by Green.    The autonomisation of the teaching 
of ‘philosophy’, identified as ‘Philosophical Idealism’ or ‘Oxford Idealism’ was the 
consequence of an anti-clerical strategy.  It was “to conquer Oxford and most other British 
Universities through the efforts of Green and his students” (Richter, 1964, 14.) 
 
Comte’s intellectual project. 
 
Born during the Revolution, Comte was sympathetic to the central control exercised politically 
by Napoleon. Comte registered at the Ecole Polytechnique (founded in 1794/5) in October, 
1814, and was one of the student leaders who supported Napoleon’s return from Elba during the 
‘100 days’.  In his life of Comte, Henri Gouhier summarised Comte’s naïve enthusiasm during 
this period in the following way: 
 
 “…everything was clear.  The emperor had renounced the ambitious and despotic ideas 
which had been so harmful during the first part of his reign;  how he had only one desire:  
to govern a free people and to work for civilisation; …” (Gouhier, 1931, 60. my 
translation1
 
) 
Comte’s enthusiasm was for a reformed and reforming Napoleon.  When, after the defeat of 
Napoleon and the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy, the Ecole Polytechnique was closed 
down, Comte founded an Association des Elèves de l’Ecole Polytechnique with cells throughout 
France and wrote an anti-government manifesto, dated June, 1816, addressed to the ‘French 
people’, entitled:  “Mes Réflexions.  Humanité, Vérité, Justice, Liberté, Patrie.  Rapprochements 
entre le régime de 1793 et celui de 1816”.  The contention of the manifesto, which was implicit 
in its juxtaposition of a moment in the historical past and the present, was that, as Gouhier 
summarises, “les peuples jugent beaucoup mieux le passé que le présent et c’est ce qui explique 
la durée des plus affreux régimes” [people judge the past much better than the present which 
explains the durability of the most frightful regimes] (Gouhier, 1931, 69).  Comte’s goal became 
to subject contemporary events to the same kind of scrutiny as had traditionally been applied, 
too late, to those of the past. “Il faut dissiper le mirage du présent” [we have to dispel the mirage 
of the present], as Gouhier paraphrases (Gouhier, 1931, 69).  This is not the place to explore in 
detail Comte’s intellectual development.  For this discussion, the important point is that Comte 
set himself a mission in which he would attempt to integrate the curricular orientation of the 
Ecole Polytechnique, as established, with his interpretation of its specific socio-political 
function.  The government re-opened the Ecole in August, 1816, on terms which Comte found 
unacceptable.  Within a year he had been introduced to Saint-Simon and became secretary to the 
group responsible for the publication of L’Industrie. 
Comte was initially a devoted follower of Saint-Simon.  In May, 1822,  Comte wrote his Plan 
des travaux scientifiques nécessaires pour réorganiser la société.  It was published that year 
with a limited circulation under the name of Saint-Simon and under the title of Système de 
Politique Positive. By 1824, Comte had decisively broken away from Saint-Simon.  The Plan 
des travaux scientifiques offered Comte’s first articulation of the relationship between the two 
tasks of reviewing the condition of the whole extent of human knowledge and of rebuilding a 
new social order.  In 1826, Comte gave the first ‘public’ lectures of his projected Cours de 
Philosophie Positive in his own apartment in Paris.  Illness caused an interruption to his scheme, 
but Comte gave the first lectures again in 1829, first of all in his own apartment and then, from 
December onwards, in a larger auditorium.  The first volume of the Cours de Philosophie 
Positive, comprising the first three lectures, was published in 1830, and subsequent volumes 
were published in 1835, 1838, 1839, 1841 and 1842, making a total of 60 lectures.  It was only 
between 1851 and 1854 that Comte published the four volumes of what was actually called the 
Système de Politique Positive, and he reprinted the early Plan des travaux scientifiques in 
                                         
1 “… tout est clair.  L’Empéreur a renoncé aux idées ambitieuses et despotiques qui furent si nuisibles pendant la 
première partie de son règne;  il n’a plus qu’un désir:  gouverner un peuple libre et travailler pour la civilisation; …” 
Volume IV, in order to try to establish that there had always been consistency of purpose from 
his earliest to his latest texts.   
 
 
In the author’s notice to the publication of the first volume of the Cours de Philosophie Positive, 
dated December 18th, 1829, Comte pointed out that the fundamental ideas contained in this first 
volume had been outlined in the Plan des travaux scientifiques. In his introduction of 1975 to a 
re-edition of the first 45 of Comte’s lectures, published under the title Philosophie première, 
Michel Serres insisted that “… le positivisme n’est pas seulement une épistémologie, une théorie 
des sciences et de la science, il est une politique, une politique des sciences et par les sciences” 
[positivism is not only an epistemology, as theory of the sciences and of science.  It is a politics, 
a politics of the sciences and by the sciences](Comte, int. Serres, 1975, 1) and he argued that the 
first lecture introduced an historical narrative whilst the second constructed a classification of 
knowledge.  Although the sequence of lectures seemed to culminate in the recommendation of a 
positivist epistemology of social science, Comte’s analyses of the state of knowledge in all the 
sciences and of their historical development were predicated on his prior commitment to social 
and political transformation.  Countering what he regarded as prevalent misreadings of Comte, 
Serres summarised this position by asserting that : 
 
 
“… positivism is not simply an objectivist epistemology with a neutral correlative and 
situated prior to our scientific activity, knowledge purged of illusion, rigour with 
ideology strained out, precision separated from metaphysical chat.  It is, additionally and 
on the contrary, the historical and cultural analysis of the accretions of all kinds which 
for thousands of years have attached to this discipline called science and have fertilized 
it.  It must be clearly stated:  social practices are here the motors of the production of 
knowledge and its laws.” (Comte, int. Serres, 1975, 11-12, my translation2
 
). 
That this is a correct reading of Comte’s thought is more evident in his first work than in the 
sequence of publications which, cumulatively, constituted the Cours de Philosophie Positive. 
From the outset of the Plan des travaux scientifiques, in the first paragraph of the Introduction, 
Comte made assertions about the current state of society.  Two systems are co-existing, one 
which is dieing out and the other which is tending to constitute itself.  In conformity with this 
state of affairs, there are two movements in conflict – one of ‘disorganization’ and the other of 
‘reorganization’.  In isolation, the first is tending to deep political and moral anarchy.  By the 
second movement, society is led “vers l’état social définitive de l’espèce humaine, le plus 
convenable à sa nature” [towards the definitive social state of human kind, the one most suited 
to its nature] (Comte, ed. Grange, 1996, 235).    Even though the old system, now described by 
Comte as the ‘feudal and theological system’ (236), is as enfeebled as it can be, the dominant 
tendency to be ‘critical’ still inhibits change.  The only way to put an end to the current anarchy 
is to persuade civilised nations to “quitter la direction critique pour prendre la direction 
organique, …” [renounce the critical direction in order to take the organic] (236).  This is the 
primary need of the current period and such also in brief  is ‘le but général de mes travaux’ [the 
general goal of my work] (236).    There then follows an account of the attempts at 
reorganization made both by ‘les rois’[kings]and by ‘les peuples’ [peoples].  The attempts made 
                                         
2 “… le positivisme n’est pas seulement une épistémologie objectiviste d’un corrélat neutre et posé là devant notre 
activité scientifique, savoir purgé du songe, rigeur filtrée de l’idéologique, précision séparée des causeries 
métaphysiques.  Il est, aussi et au contraire, une analyse historique et culturelle des adhérences de tous ordres qui 
collent depuis des millénaires à cette formation nommée science et la fécondent.  Il faut le dire en clair:  les 
pratiques sociales sont ici motrices de la production du savoir et des lois.” 
in good faith by kings to restore social harmony have failed and the decadence of the system has 
been the ‘necessary consequence of the march of civilisation’ (238).  The error of the people is 
no less vicious but it is more excusable because they are seeking to align themselves with 
progress whereas the kings were blatantly reactionary.  The people are setting about 
reorganization in the wrong way:  “L’opinion dominante dans l’esprit des peuples sur la manière 
dont la société doit être réorganisée, a pour trait caractéristique une profonde ignorance des 
conditions fondamentales que doit remplir un système social quelconque pour avoir une 
consistence véritable.” [the dominant opinion in the mind of peoples on the manner in which 
society should be reorganized has as its characteristic trait a deep ignorance of the fundamental 
conditions which any social system whatever must fulfill to have a true consistency] (241).  The 
people have set about reorganizing society by criticising previous social organization rather than 
by determining the new needs which are consequent on changing social circumstances.  They 
have emphasized freedom from governmental authority in a way which sustains the assumed 
relationship between individual and state which typified monarchical structures.  The ‘dogma of 
the unlimited freedom of conscience’ has the effect of preventing “l’établissement uniforme 
d’un système quelconque d’idées générales, sans lequel néanmoins il n’y a pas de société, en 
proclamant la souveraineté de chaque raison individuelle” [the uniform establishment of any 
kind of system of general ideas, without which nevertheless there is no society, by proclaiming 
the sovereignty of each individual reason] (242).    The apparent liberty of thinking in political 
affairs simply shows that political science has not yet reached the level of certainty achieved in 
these other sciences, but it would be a mistake to convert this transitory shortcoming into an 
absolute and eternal dogma.  To make a fundamental maxim of liberty of conscience, concludes 
Comte in this part of his argument, “c’est évidemment proclamer que la société doit toujours 
rester sans doctrines générales.  On doit convenir qu’un tel dogme mérite, en effet, les reproches 
d’anarchie qui lui sont addressés par les meilleurs défenseurs du système théologique.” 
[evidently is to proclaim that society must always remain without general doctrines.  We have to 
agree that such a dogma does, in effect, merit the reproach of anarchy which are levelled at it by 
the best defenders of the theological system] (243). 
 
 
The new organic direction which has to be taken in effecting social reorganization demands, 
instead, that the scientific method which has secured authority for scientists in the natural 
sciences should now be deployed in respect of social and political phenomena such that change 
can be planned with comparable authority.  On reflection, Comte says, his conclusion can be 
summarised in this one following idea:  “les savants doivent aujourd’hui élever la politique au 
rang des sciences d’observation” [scientists today must raise politics to the level of the sciences 
of observation](272). 
 
It is significant that Comte takes a very long time providing the social historical context for the 
kind of thinking that is now required before he offers his guidelines about precisely how that 
thinking should proceed.  The important ‘generalisation’ which Comte introduced at this late 
point in the Plan des travaux scientifiques is his famous characterisation of the ‘three states’of 
human knowledge..  He introduced  this ‘generalisation’ boldly in the following way: 
 “By the very nature of the human mind, each branch of our knowledge is necessarily 
compelled in its progress to pass successively through three different theoretical states:  
the theological or fictional state; the metaphysical or abstract; and, finally, the scientific 
or positivist state” (272, my translation)3
                                         
3 “Par la nature même de l’esprit humain, chaque branche de nos connaissances est nécessairement 
assujettie dans sa marche à passer successivement par trois états théoriques différents:  l’état théologique 
ou fictive;  l’état métaphysique ou abstrait; enfin, l’état scientifique ou positif.” 
 
In considering politics as a science, Comte said that it had already passed through the first two 
stages and was ready for the third, but his proof is initially expressed in terms of his earlier 
periodisation of history.    It appears that the prerequisites for the introduction of positivist 
political science are both intellectual and social.  Comte argues that the other sciences had to 
have become dominantly positivist to allow for the positivist analysis of human behaviour in 
society whilst it was also necessary for the march of civilisation to have reached the point at 
which the implementation of positivist political thinking would be possible.  That time had now 
come and Comte messianically announced the three series of works to be undertaken.  The 
second and third were, respectively, the foundation of an educational system to reinforce the 
positivist perspective and the explanation of how collective activity should develop to enable 
men to modify nature for the benefit of all.  The rest of the Plan des travaux scientifiques, 
however, was devoted entirely to the first series of tasks which had as its object 
 
“… the development of the system of historical observations on the general progression 
of the human mind, destined to be the positivist basis of politics such that it will lose 
entirely both its theological and metaphysical character to become imprinted with the 
scientific character.” (277, my translation4
 
 
 
In the remainder of the Plan des travaux scientifiques Comte devoted himself to a consideration 
of the development of political science, giving, for instance, detailed critiques of the work of 
Montesquieu and Condorcet.  In other words, Comte embarked already here upon the analyses 
which were to be the culmination of the lectures given in the Cours de Philosophie Positive.   
 
What was presented in the Plan des travaux scientifiques rather late in the argument as  a 
‘generalisation’ was offered firmly at the outset of the Cours as a ‘law’ which exemplifies in 
action the ‘science positive’ of both social statics and social dynamics.  The method of Comte’s 
proposed Cours is an exemplification of the method which the Cours seeks to legitimate. Comte 
proceeded to elaborate the characteristics of the three states and then repeated the evidence for 
the law, the first of which was an argument by analogy with individual intellectual development 
and the second of which was pragmatic.  The most important pragmatic benefit of the law of the 
three states ‘consiste dans le besoin, à toute époque, d’une théorie quelconque pour lier les faits, 
combiné avec l’impossibilité évidente, pour l’esprit humain à son origine, de se former des 
théories d’après les observations.’ [consists in the need, at every epoch, for a theory of any kind 
to link facts, combined with the evident impossibility for the human mind at its origin to form 
theories on the basis of observations] (55)   In the first lecture Comte wanted to argue that the 
crucial lacuna  in the development of knowledge is in respect of social phenomena.  All that 
remains is to find the laws of social phenomena, to conclude, as he puts it, ‘le système des 
sciences d’observation en fondant la physique sociale’[the system of the sciences of observation 
by establishing social physics] (64).  The first goal of his lectures would be to contribute to this 
crucial endeavour, but he was anxious to insist that this is not the same thing as the second, 
general goal, which is to offer ‘un cours de philosophie positive, et non pas seulement un cours 
de physique sociale.’ [a course of positivist philosophy and not just a course of social physics] 
(65) 
 
                                                                                                                                   
 
4 “… la formation du système d’observations historiques sur la marche générale de l’esprit humain, destiné à être la 
base positive de la politique, de manière à lui faire perdre entièrement le caractère théologique et le caractère 
métaphysique, pour lui imprimer le caractère scientifique.” 
 
It is important to register, in other words, that positive social science is only the final piece in the 
jigsaw which constitutes the positivist system and, crucially, that the ‘positivist’ epistemology of 
the social sciences which appears to be articulated in the later lectures of the Cours is thought 
only to be possible in as much as it functionally requires the a priori input of the theory of 
philosophical positivism as a surrogate theology. When the study of social phenomena is 
committed to the positive approach, Comte argues that all possible phenomena will then have 
become subjected to a homogeneous conceptualisation – one which rejects explanation in terms 
of first causes.  New observations in relation to all phenomena will develop our knowledge, but 
the fundamental principle of organization will have been achieved.  The development of positive 
social science is the final piece in the jigsaw which achieves the universality of positive method 
in all sciences.  Whilst there were still some hangovers of theological or metaphysical thinking 
in some sciences, the development of positive social science will make the system of positive 
thinking complete.  It is the ‘philosophie positive’, the whole positive system which is realised 
as a result of the development of positive social science, the whole system ‘deviendra capable de 
se substituer entièrement, avec toute sa supériorité naturelle, à la philosophie théologique et à la 
philosophie métaphysique, dont cette universalité est aujourd’hui la seule propriété réelle, et qui, 
privées d’un tel motif de préférence, n’auront plus pour nos successeurs qu’une existence 
historique.’ [will become capable of being substituted entirely, with all its natural superiority, 
for theological and metaphysical philosophies whose universality is today their only real 
property and which, deprived of this advantage, will have no more than an historical existence 
for our successors](65).  A dogmatic philosophy of science is to become the basis of a system of 
thinking which will generate a substitute religion having the same social effects as did the 
combined intellectual and ecclesiastical forces of medieval scholasticism. Comte finally  
summarised four fundamental properties of the ‘philosophie positive’ which he considered to be 
its main advantages.  The first of these emphasized that the study of the forms which intellectual 
activity has taken is the best way, in fact ‘le seul vrai moyen rationnel’ [the only true and 
rational means](70) , to expose the laws of logic of the human mind.  Comte’s approach here 
was almost phenomenological and he proceeded to criticise psychology as fiercely as Husserl 
was to do in his Logical Investigations.  Comte outlined the procedures to be adopted in 
analysing ‘social statics’ and ‘social dynamics’ and stated categorically that “On voit que, sous 
aucun rapport, il n’y a place pour cette psychologie illusoire, dernière transformation de la 
théologie, qu’on tente si vainement de ranimer aujourd’hui, …” [we see that under no 
circumstances is there any place for this illusory psychology, the last transformation of theology, 
the revival of which is so vainly attempted today] (71).  Comte rejected any notion of internal 
observation and considered any psychology which sought to explain behaviour by reference to 
psychic essence to be operating metaphysically.  The second and third properties of ‘philosophie 
positive’ related to education and to the artificiality of discipline boundaries, but the fourth 
needs some elaboration.  Comte commented that he felt able to assume that his audience would 
agree that ‘les idées gouvernent et bouleversent le monde’ [ideas govern and overthrow the 
world] or, in other words, that ‘tout le mécanisme social repose finalement sur des opinions’ [all 
the social mechanism rests ultimately on opinions](80).  He pushed this anti-materialist 
assumption further in saying that all would be agreed that ‘la grande crise politique et morale 
des sociétés actuelles tient, en dernière analyse, à l’anarchie intellectuelle’ [the great political 
and moral crisis of contemporary societies relates, in the final analysis, to intellectual 
anarchy](80).  Hence, for Comte, the overriding need to supply a coherent intellectual system to 
consolidate the achievements of the Scientific Revolution.  Reverting to the law of the three 
states of knowledge, Comte claimed that the intellectual anarchy experienced by his 
contemporaries arose from the simultaneous use of the three philosophies which are radically 
incompatible – the theological, metaphysical and positive. ‘Philosophie positive’ is ‘destined’ to 
prevail and its absolute domination is almost accomplished.  For Comte, there was no question 
of admitting co-existing spheres of meaning and he boldly concluded:  “Complétant la vaste 
operation intellectuelle commencée par Bacon, par Descartes et par Galilée, construisons 
directement le système d’idées générales que cette philosophie est désormais destinée à faire 
indéfiniment prévaloir dans l’espèce humaine, et la crise révolutionnaire qui tourmente les 
peuples civilisés sera essentiellement terminée.” [Bringing to a conclusion the vast intellectual 
operation begun by Bacon, Descartes and Galileo, let us construct directly the system of general 
ideas which this philosophy is henceforth destined to make eternally prevalent in human kind so 
that the revolutionary crisis which tourments civilised peoples will be essentially ended] (82) 
 
In summary, the epistemology of the social sciences which Comte articulated in his late lectures 
was inextricably linked with the realisation of a new form of social organisation. In her 
‘presentation’  of extracts from Comte’s work, entitled “philosophie des sciences”, Juliette 
Grange insisted on describing Comte’s philosophy of the sciences as ‘positivisme historique’ to 
differentiate his position from that of the positivist tradition.  She argued that: 
 
“It will be appropriate to understand Comte’s project precisely, which was to prolong the 
history of metaphysics by a philosophy of science which is also a theory of knowledge” 
(Comte, int. Grange, 1996, 9, my translation)5
  
 
 
Comte’s blueprint for positivist social science, as advanced in the last 15 lectures of his Cours 
(46-60), has been extrapolated from the historical progression within which it acquired its 
meaning as, paradoxically, a prolongation of a metaphysical frame of thinking.  In particular, the 
48th Lecture, containing an introduction to ‘social statics and dynamics’ and to research 
methods involving ‘observation’, ‘experimentation’ and ‘comparison’, has been taken out of the 
context set for it by the 46th lecture in which Comte re-emphasized the positivist political 
programme and the 47th Lecture in which he  elaborated his contention that ‘the notion of 
progress must necessarily precede the constitution of social science’, concluding with a section 
on ‘the indispensable historical foundation of sociology’.  Comte’s account of ‘observation’ 
makes it clear that his systematic understanding of the progress of human knowledge constituted 
the substance of his a priori organisation of observed facts.  In introducing the 48th Lecture, 
Comte argued explicitly that the practice of social science should be seen to be embedded within 
the historical progression of human knowledge and should not be thought to be the 
operationalisation of an abstract logic of science: 
 
 
“ … in sociology as elsewhere, and even more than elsewhere, the positivist method will 
only be essentially appreciated after the rational consideration of its principal uses, in 
proportion to their gradual accomplishment:  such that there can be no question here of a 
true, logical treatise preliminary to method in social physics.” (Comte, int. Enthoven, 
1975, 101, my translation6
 
) 
The articulation of a methodology of the social sciences is dependent on the elaboration, by 
analogy, of what has been learnt historically about the development of other sciences.  The 
advance of social science has been especially retarded as a consequence of  the malign influence 
                                         
5 “Il conviendra de comprendre précisément la tentative de Comte, qui est de prolonger l’histoire de la 
métaphysique par une philosophie de la science qui soit aussi une théorie de la connaissance”. 
 
6 “… en sociologie comme ailleurs, et même plus qu’ailleurs, la méthode positive ne saurait être essentiellement 
appréciée que d’après la considération rationnelle de ses principaux emplois, à mesure de leur accomplissement 
graduel:  en sorte qu’il ne peut ici être nullement question d’un vrai traité logique préliminaire de la méthode en 
physique sociale.” 
of metaphysical philosophy.  Without engaging specifically with the work of any one 
philosopher, Comte contended that the emphasis on simple and practical observation had been 
undermined by philosophical scepticism: 
 
 
“The anarchic social influence of the metaphysical philosophy of the last century, 
extending from doctrine to method, tended, by a blind destructive instinct, to prevent in 
some way every further intellectual reorganisation, by destroying in advance the only 
logical bases on which truly scientific analyses could rest, through this absurd theory of 
historical pyrrhonism, which still maintains today its pernicious action.  Although its 
principle is no longer openly upheld.  Exaggerating to the most excessive degree in 
respect of social events the general difficulties which are common to every exact 
observation of whatever kind, …, these sophistical aberrations either wittingly or 
unwittingly have often been pushed to the point of dogmatically denying every true 
certainty in social observations, even direct ones.” (Comte, int. Enthoven, 137, my 
translation7
 
) 
Whilst, for instance, in the Faculty of Letters at the Sorbonne, Victor Cousin was, in 1819 and 
1820, presenting his course of lectures on 18th century moral philosophy, part of which was to be 
published in 1842 as the Philosophie de Kant (Cousin, 1842), considering Kant’s ‘critical’ 
response to earlier metaphysical speculation, Comte resolutely sought to reject all forms of 
academic epistemology as intrinsically metaphysical and to recommend, instead, a practice for 
social scientists based on practical precedents established in all other sciences. 
 
Mill’s project. 
 
John Stuart Mill’s famously precocious intellectual formation was grounded in precisely the 
kind of philosophical metaphysics which Comte determinedly sought to discredit.  The growth 
of ‘philosophic radicalism’, classically analysed by Elie Halévy, was, as his title suggests, the 
advancement of a reforming social and political programme, mainly associated with the 
recommendations of Jeremy Bentham, based on philosophical principles articulated by his 
collaborator – James Mill, father of John Stuart. In most of his book, Halévy paid attention 
predominantly to the work of Bentham, but in the third volume, devoted specifically to the 
philosophical underpinning of Bentham’s proposed reforms, there is more consideration of the 
work of James Mill.  Considering the views of both on the ‘laws of thought and action’, Halévy 
wrote that: 
 
“The true aim which James Mill set before himself in working at the theory of the 
phenomena of the human mind was to arrive at the practical, and to make possible a new 
logic, a new morality and a new pedagogy.  It was only after his death that Stuart Mill, 
his son and pupil, wrote out the logic of associationism.  But Bentham and James Mill 
had already laboured to establish the pedagogy and the morality of the Utilitarians: …” 
(Halévy, 1928, 455)  
                                         
7 “L’anarchique influence sociale de la philosophie métaphysique du siècle dernier, s’étendant de la doctrine à la 
méthode, a tendu par un aveugle instinct de destruction à empêcher en quelque sorte toute ultérieure réorganisation 
intellectuelle, en ruinant d’avance les seules bases logiques sur lesquelles pussent reposer des analyses vraiment 
scientifiques, par cette absurde théorie du pyrrhonisme historique, qui prolonge encore aujourd’hui son action 
délétère. Quoique son principe ne soit plus ostensiblement soutenu.  Exagérant, au degré le plus désordonné, au 
sujet des événements sociaux, les difficultés générales communes à toute exacte observation quelconque, …, ces 
aberrations sophistiques volontaires ou involontaires ont été souvent poussées jusqu’à dénier dogmatiquement toute 
vraie certitude aux observations sociales, même directes.” 
 
As evidence of James Mill’s ‘true aim’, Halévy referred to chapter 25 of his Analysis of the 
Phenomena of the Human Mind, published in 1829.  It was in this text that James Mill 
developed further the ‘associationism’ which the movement had inherited from David Hartley’s 
mid-18th century materialisation8 of Locke’s ‘way of ideas’ advanced in the Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding9
 
.  Bentham and James Mill remained committed to the associationist 
view that social policy should be produced by working with the consequences of a human 
psychology which we would label ‘behaviourist’.  The education to which James Mill subjected 
his son was designed to equip his son to continue to follow through the ‘necessarian’ or 
determinist implications of associationist psychology for human action.  It was as a part of 
James Mill’s enactment of his associationist principles in the field of pedagogy that he sought 
systematically to engineer the development of his son’s intellect.  John Stuart Mill’s 
Autobiography (the ‘early draft’ written in 1853-4) records, what is most known, how he was 
taught Greek from the age of three and Latin from the age of eight.  Less known, perhaps, is 
Mill’s recollection that: 
“From about the age of twelve I entered into another and more advanced stage in my 
course of instruction – in which the main object was no longer the aids and appliances of 
thought, but the thoughts themselves.  This commenced with Logic, in which I began at 
once with the Organon and read it to the Analytics inclusive, …” (J.S. Mill, ed. Robson 
& Stillinger, 2006, 20) 
 
It was about this time that Bentham wrote his Essay on Logic, which was only published 
posthumously in 1838 – 1843 (Bowring, volume viii, 213-293).  The consequence of the father’s 
introduction of the son to the study of logic was, however, in the end that the son would resist 
elaborating a metaphysically associationist logic and, instead, would devote himself to the 
articulation of the autonomous laws of logic. 
 
In the year of his introduction to logic, 1818, John Stuart Mill proof-read his father’s History of 
India which was a book which was ‘saturated … with the principles and modes of judgement of 
democratic radicalism then regarded as extreme’ (J.S. Mill, ed. Robson & Stillinger, 2006, 28).  
In spite of the father’s critique in his book of the actions of the East India Company, the father 
was appointed a year later to be one of the assistants to its Examiner of Indian Correspondence.  
In May, 1823, J.S. Mill was to be appointed to be under his father in the same position, 
remaining in the same post, apart from promotion, until retirement.  J.S. Mill spent May,1820- 
July, 1821 in France as a guest of Jeremy Bentham’s brother, Samuel, and he attended winter 
courses of lectures in the Faculty of Sciences at Montpellier, including a course on logic.  On his 
travels, he encountered Jean-Baptiste Say whom he retrospectively described as “a man of the 
later period of the French Revolution, a fine specimen of the best kind of old French republican, 
one of those who had never bent the knee to Bonaparte though courted by him; …” (J.S. Mill, 
ed. Robson & Stillinger, 2006, 62).  Say was ‘acquainted with many of the chiefs of the Liberal 
party’ and, retrospectively again, J.S. Mill commented that “The chief fruit which I carried away 
from the society I saw, was a strong interest in Continental Libralism, of which I always 
afterwards kept myself au courant as much as of English politics” (J.S. Mill, ed. Robson & 
Stillinger, 2006, 62). 
 
It is important constantly to emphasize the retrospective status of Mill’s Autobiography because, 
as we shall see, it was in the 1820s, before commencing what was to become his A system of 
                                         
8 Hartley, D., 1966.  
9 Locke, J., 1961. 
Logic, that J.S. Mill shook off the deterministic orientation of the associationist legacy of 
Bentham and his father, becoming convinced that it denied individual liberty.  On returning to 
England from France, he was introduced to the work of Condillac by his father and persuaded by 
his father that Condillac’s Traité des Sensations and Cours d’Etudes were works which were 
inferior to Hartley’s Observations on Man.  Whilst J.S. Mill’s theoretical thinking was still 
dominated by that of his father, he claimed, nevertheless, to have reflected for the first time on 
political events in France during the previous thirty years and, at the time at which Comte was 
adapting the Napoleonic legacy for the new age, to have conceptualised those events as a 
process of removing ‘absolute monarchy’ and then falling ‘under the despotism of Bonaparte’ 
(J.S. Mill, ed. Robson & Stillinger, 2006, 64) such that ‘the greatest glory I was capable of 
conceiving was that of figuring, successful or unsuccessful, as a Girondist in an English 
Convention’ (J.S. Mill, ed. Robson & Stillinger, 2006, 66).  James Mill commenced his Analysis 
of thePhenomena of the Human Mind in 1822.  J.S. Mill read drafts in the years preceding its 
publication in 1829 and he read other writers on ‘mental philosophy’ but, in the Autobiography, 
he took 1822 as the starting point for his individual intellectual development, connected with the 
founding, in the winter of 1822/3, of the ‘Utilitarian’ Society and, at the same time, of the 
Westminster Review, which James Mill inaugurated with an introductory critique of the 
Edinburgh Review in which he exposed the ‘thoroughly aristocratic composition’ (J.S. Mill, ed. 
Robson & Stillinger, 2006, 94) of the British constitution.  It was a time, as J.S. Mill recalled, 
‘of rapidly rising Liberalism’ in Britain, when ‘Radicalism, under the lead of the Burdetts and 
Cobbetts, had assumed a character which seriously alarmed the Administration’ (J.S. Mill, ed. 
Robson & Stillinger, 2006, 100) and when, consequently, the ‘Benthamic type of radicalism’ 
received attention which was out of proportion to the number of its adherents.  J.S. Mill’s 
account renders ‘liberalism’ and ‘radicalism’ almost synonymous.  The motor for reform seems 
to have been a common opposition to aristocratic privilege.  J.S. Mill recollects that ‘in the first 
two or three years of the Westminster Review, the French philosophes of the eighteeenth century 
were the example we sought to imitate …’ (J.S. Mill, 2006, ed., Robson & Stuillinger, 2006, 
110), and it was in a subsequent grouping of young men – the Society of Students of Mental 
Philosophy – convened by George Grote from 1825, that J.S. Mill had the opportunity to pursue 
his study of logic.  They first read political economy together, then logic, followed by analytic 
psychology through the study of Hartley.  It was in this context that J.S. Mill first ‘formed the 
project of writing a book on Logic, though on a much humbler scale than the one I ultimately 
executed’ (J.S. Mill, ed. Robson & Stillinger, 2006, 124).  This was a period of transformation in 
J.S. Mill’s thinking which he was to call ‘a crisis in my mental history’ and, ceasing to write for 
the Westminster Review in 1828, he found the opportunity to redefine his position.  J.S. Mill 
detailed the depression which affected him in the autumn of 1826 in a chapter of that title in the 
published edition of the Autobiography.  It is well known that J.S. Mill considered that the 
education of his ‘feelings’ had been deficient and that he found solace in the work of Coleridge 
and Wordsworth.  More importantly for our purposes, he attributed the impoverishment of his 
education to the inadequacy of the theory of associationism.  Macaulay’s critique of James 
Mill’s Essay on Government, published in the Edinburgh Review in March, 1829, helped J.S. 
Mill to define more clearly the nature of the theory’s error.  Macaulay argued for ‘the empirical 
mode of treating political phenomena against the philosophical’ (J.S. Mill, ed. Robson & 
Stillinger, 2006, 164).  J.S. Mill recalls that it was his reflection on the opposition between his 
father and Macaulay which merged at the time with the commencement of his systematic work 
on Logic to enable him to articulate the fundamental argument of his A System of Logic and, in 
particular, that of Book VI on the ‘Logic of the Moral Sciences’. 
 
Writing in 1853-4 (after the publication of A System of Logic), J.S. Mill expressed the 
conclusion which he derived from the debate between Macaulay and his father in the following 
way: 
 
“… it appeared that both Macaulay and my father were wrong;  the one in assimilating 
the method of philosophizing in politics to the purely experimental method of chemistry;  
while the other, though right in adopting an a priori method, had made a wrong selection 
of one, having taken, not the appropriate method, that of deductive branches of natural 
philosophy, but the inappropriate method of pure geometry, which not being a science of 
causation at all, did not require or admit of the sumation of effects.” (J.S. Mill, ed. 
Robson & Stillinger, 2006, 166 and 168). 
 
It seems likely, however, that, at about 1830, this was not yet the true nature of J.S. Mill’s 
thinking.  There are some cancelled sentences of the ‘early draft’ at this point in the text, the first 
of which states that “I did not at this time push my logical speculations any further” (J.S. Mill, 
ed. Robson & Stillinger, 2006, 168n), followed by recollections of his contemporary 
acquaintance with the  work of the Saint Simonian school which are restored to the full text a 
few pages later.  J.S. Mill had met Gustave d’Eichthal, a prominent Saint Simonian, in the 
middle of 1828, and had been given a copy of Comte’s Traité de Politique Positive (even though 
Comte was no longer a Saint Simonian).  In October, 1829, Mill wrote to d’Eichthal, indicating 
that he was impressed by Comte’s treatise.  He was most impressed by the Saint Simonian 
theory of history and by Comte’s version of it.  In the ‘early draft’ of the autobiography, J.S. 
Mill writes that he ‘was greatly struck with the connected view which they for the first time 
presented to me, of the natural order of human progress; …’ (J.S. Mill, ed. Robson & Stillinger, 
2006, 170).  Iris Mueller has pointed out that only a little earlier, in 1827, J.S. Mill had given a 
speech on the ‘Use of History’ in which he had repeated the Benthamite contention that 
knowledge of human nature is ‘more important than knowledge of history in determining the 
type of institutions needed by any society’ (Mueller, 1956, 58).  Mill seems immediately to have 
imbibed the Saint Simonian and Comtean view that there are alternating critical and organic 
ages in history with corresponding forms of critical and organic thought.  He seems to have 
made a shift away from direct, critical involvement in politics towards organic prescription for 
future development.  Whereas, following his first reading of Bentham in 1821,  he had had only 
one object in life – ‘to be a reformer of the world’ (J.S. Mill, ed. Robson & Stillinger, 2006, 136) 
– which had animated his writing and actions, by October, 1831, he was writing to Sterling that 
the “only thing which I can usefully do at present, and which I am doing more and more every 
day, is to work out principles; which are of use for all times, though to be applied cautiously and 
circumspectly to any.  … The only thing that I believe I am really fit for is the investigation of 
abstract truth, and the more abstract the better. …” (quoted in Mueller, 1956, 61).  He had 
reached the conclusion, in other words, that his role as an intellectual within history was to 
clarify the means by which a-historical verities might be attained.  Mill’s gradual 
disappointment with the aftermath of the French revolution of July, 1830, consolidated this new 
stance.  The July Revolution had failed to destroy the power of a privileged class minority and 
Mill was initially attracted by the idealism of the Saint Simonians and Comte who sought to 
argue for the reorganization of society in the interests of all the people, but Mill did not see 
himself as an active participant in this change.  Whereas Comte’s presentation of his lectures of 
the Cours de Philosophie Positive during the 1830s was designed to actualise conceptually his 
political vision, Mill conceived his intellectual role in the same period to be that of detached 
facilitator. 
 
Contrast between Mill and Comte. 
 
What Mill began to write on Logic between 1830/1 and 1837 is separately published as the 
“Early Draft” in Appendix A of volume 8 of The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (J.S. Mill, 
ed. Robson, 2006).  This corresponds quite closely to what was subsequently published, in 1843, 
as the Introduction, and Books I and II. After reading volumes I and II of Comte’s Cours de 
philosophie positive, Mill wrote three chapters of Book III in the autumn of 1837 and it seems 
likely that he completed the rest of Book III, Books IV and V, and probably Book VI, between 
that autumn and the summer/autumn of 1840.  As was his custom, Mill re-wrote his drafts 
before publication, and he began the rewriting of the Logic in April, 1841.  He submitted his 
final draft to the publisher in mid-1842 but there were delays in production which enabled Mill 
to insert some late revisions.  Volume VI of Comte’s Cours de philosophie positive was 
published in 1842 and, as Robson puts it: 
 
“Mill, having in the interval read Comte’s fourth and fifth volumes, was immensely 
impressed by the sixth, which led him, in January, 1843, into a ‘remaniement complet’ of 
the concluding chapters of Book VI.” (J.S. Mill, ed. Robson, 2006, lxviii-lxix) 
 
It is not possible here to unravel the complexities of the amendments which Mill made to his 
final draft as a consequence of his reading of the sections of Comte’s Cours devoted to 
‘Physique sociale’.  I simply want to re-iterate the general point which has informed my 
background commentary on the work of the two thinkers. 
 
By the time that Mill commenced work on his Logic, he had rejected the metaphysical 
necessarianism which had informed the work of his father. In his Introduction to A System of 
Logic, written in the early 1830s and relatively unchanged thereafter, J.S. Mill was insistent that 
his consideration of logical processes was entirely separate from metaphysical explanation of 
mental activity.  He assigned to ‘a perfectly distinct branch of Science:  the higher or 
transcendental metaphysics’ all questions such as: 
 
“Whether our emotions are innate, or the result of association:  whether God, & duty, are 
realities the existence of which is manifest to us a priori by the constitution of our 
rational faculty; …” (J.S. Mill, ed. Robson, 2006, 964). 
 
J.S. Mill would attempt to analyse reasoning itself as an associationist process, but he explicitly 
turned his back on the metaphysical associationism which had pervaded his father’s Analysis of 
the Phenomena of the Human Mind.  J.S. Mill rejected the proto-behaviourist orientation of the 
associationist legacy.  In doing so, he deprived his philosophizing of any ontological base.  
Although, for a time, he was struck by the Saint Simonian/Comtist theory of historical 
progression, he did not insert his own agency within that progression.  Between writing the 
opening books of A System of Logic and the final writing, J.S. Mill had been impressed by de 
Tocqueville’s De la Démocratie en Amérique which he reviewed shortly after its publication in 
1835.  De Tocqueville celebrated the democratic de-centralisation and voluntary associationism 
opposed by the Saint-Simonians and Comte. Coming, therefore, to Comte’s last volumes of the 
Cours de philosophie positive in the late 1830s and early 1840s, Mill was disposed towards a 
liberal accommodation of the position which, for Comte, integrated positivist scientific practice 
with an ontogenetic conception of historical progression.  In spite of the civility of the exchange 
– and Mill’s deference – the correspondence between Mill and Comte which developed for 
several years , commencing on November 8th, 1841, highlights the nature of the impasse.  In the 
first letter of self-introduction, J.S. Mill indicated that he had been brought up – almost born – as 
a Benthamite and he continued: 
 
 
“Although Benthamism has, doubtless, remained very far from the true spirit of the 
positivist method, this doctrine still seems to me at present to be the best preparation 
which exists today to true positivity, applied to social doctrines;  either by its tight logic, 
and by the care it takes always to understand itself, or especially by its systematic 
opposition to every attempt to explain any phenomena whatever by means of ridiculous 
metaphysical entities, of which it taught me from my earliest youth to feel the essential 
worthlessness”. (Lévy-Bruhl, ed., 1899b, 2.  Written by Mill in French10
 
, my translation) 
In his reply of three weeks later Comte agreed that, ‘surtout pour l’Angleterre’, Benthamite 
doctrine was the best preparation for ‘positivité sociologique’.  However, Comte insisted that his 
own education had obviated the need for such a preparation and that Bentham had not 
understood the implications of his theory.  Whilst Comte seems to acknowledge that 
methodological or philosophical differences are the consequences of culturally different 
formations, nevertheless he insists that his positivism is an intellectual phase which supercedes 
precursors.  Referring to Benthamism, Comte replied: 
 
 
“… if I myself have avoided this phase, that doubtless arises from the personal 
circumstances of my education which, imbibing me from my infancy with the rudiments 
of the true positivist method, enabled me to feel in time how much Bentham had 
imperfectly understood this method in spite of his evident tendency to make it prevail 
everywhere.” (Lévy-Bruhl, ed., 1899b, 7, my translation11
 
) 
In introducing, in 1899, his edition of the hitherto unpublished full correspondence between Mill 
and Comte, Lévy-Bruhl made two extremely pertinent observations.  He commented, firstly, 
that: 
 
“Mill proposes to Comte that they should discuss together their ‘opinions’ on certain 
points.  But Comte does not have ‘opinions’ in Mill’s sense of the word.  He has a body 
of doctrine, a system.  He has constructed this system quite specificially to bring to an 
end the ebb and flow of ‘opinions’ between which the minds of our time float and which 
prevent the establishment of firm convictions.”  (Lévy-Bruhl, ed., 1899b, xiii, my 
translation12
 
). 
Lévy-Bruhl rightly noted that Mill fundamentally misunderstood, or sought to resist, Comte’s 
contention that thoughts are embedded in the process of socio-historical change and cannot be 
extrapolated from that process to become the basis for detached, liberal scrutiny.  Lévy-Bruhl’s 
second observation makes the same point rather differently: 
 
 “In the course of the letters which we are publishing today, Mill avoids discussing 
Comte’s political and social ideas.  In general, he raises only purely philosophical 
questions, in the hope of removing the ‘several secondary differences’ which remain 
                                         
10 “Quoique le Benthamisme soit resté, sans doute, très loin du véritable esprit de la méthode positive, cette doctrine 
me paraît encore à présent la meilleure préparation qui existe aujourd’hui à la vraie positivité, appliquée aux 
doctrines sociales: soit par sa logique serrée, et par le soin qu’elle a de toujours se comprendre elle-même, soit 
surtout par son opposition systématique à toute tentative d’explication de phénomènes quelconques du moyen des 
ridicules entités métaphysiques, dont elle m’appris dès ma première jeunesse à sentir la nullité essentielle” 
11 “… si j’ai moi-même évité cette phase, cela tient sans doute à des circonstances personnelles d’éducation, qui, 
m’ayant imbu, dès mon enfance, des rudiments de la vraie méthode positive, m’ont permis de sentir à temps 
combien Bentham avait imparfaitement compris cette méthode, malgré sa tendance évidente à la faire partout 
prévaloir.” 
12 “Mill propose à Comte de discuter ensemble leurs ‘opinions’ sur certains points.  Mais Comte n’a pas 
d’’opinions’, au sens où Mill prend ce mot.  Il a un corps de doctrine, un système.  Il a construit ce système tout 
exprès pour mettre un terme au flux et au reflux des ‘opinions’ mouvantes entre lesquelles flottent les esprits de 
notre temps, et qui empêchent les convictions fermes de s’établir.” 
there between them.  But far from weakening these differences, the discussion aggravates 
them.” (Lévy-Bruhl, ed., 1899b, xxiii, my translation13
 
) 
Again, Lévy-Bruhl rightly saw that Mill attempted to autonomise his philosophy of social 
science, detaching it from changing social and political conditions, in a way which was, for 
Comte, unacceptable and impossible. 
 
The letters of Comte to Mill had already been published in France in 1877.  It is significant that 
Lévy-Bruhl chose to edit the exchange of letters between the two men.  Lévy-Bruhl had already 
written two books on German philosophy of the 18th Century and the social conditions of its 
production (Lévy-Bruhl, 1890 and 1894), and was publishing, in English in the same year, his 
History of  Modern Philosophy in France (Lévy-Bruhl, 1899a).  His work on Comte was to be 
published the following year (Lévy-Bruhl, 1900).  Lévy-Bruhl was, therefore, precisely 
interested in whether philosophical ‘discourse’ transcends the socio-cultural conditions of its 
production or whether philosophical ‘discourses’ are always integrally specific to those 
conditions.  This interest became more fully realised as Lévy-Bruhl subsequently investigated 
anthropological evidence in order to determine whether different ‘mentalités’ function 
differently in different societies, notably, of course, in his much maligned Les fonctions 
mentales dans les sociétés inférieures (Lévy-Bruhl, 1910) and La mentalité primitive (Lévy-
Bruhl, 1922).  Mill and Comte had both been hostile to metaphysical speculation, condemning 
the epistemological skepticism of Hume, and both had been relatively indifferent to the 
epistemological endeavours of Kant.  Neither worked within academic contexts nor accepted the 
academic ideology which was the corollary of Kantian idealism. Nevertheless, Mill sought to 
offer an universally valid logic which was primarily based on an analysis of English language 
usage, whilst Comte sought to base a theory of universal socio-political progress on his 
perception of transitions primarily in French history.  The challenge in our contemporary global 
context is to consider whether international intellectual exchange can establish and apply a 
homogeneous logic of social science or whether homogenised socio-cultural practices should 
emerge ontologically from the shared development of an universal historical consciousness.  
Mill versus Comte remains a potent reference for articulating our choice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
13 “Au cours des lettres que nous publions aujourd’hui, Mill évite de mettre en discussion les idées politiques et 
sociales de Comte.  Il ne soulève, en général, que des questions purement philosophiques, dans l’espoir d’effacer les 
‘quelques divergences secondaires’ qui subsistent là entre Comte et lui.  Mais, loin d’atténuer ces divergences, la 
discussion les aggrave.” 
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